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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-2932 
____________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DAVID RAMSEY, 
 
             Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 1-12-cr-00310-003) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 June 18, 2019 
____________ 
 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed July 19, 2019) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 David Joseph Ramsey, Jr., was convicted and sentenced in 2014 for possession 
with intent to distribute illegal drugs.  Ramsey began supervised release in October 2016.   
Subsequently, York County Police charged Ramsey with strangulation and harassment of 
his then-girlfriend in August of 2018.     
U.S. Marshals arrested Ramsey for violating the terms of his supervised release.  
Following a revocation hearing, he was found guilty by the District Court and was 
sentenced to 36 months of incarceration.  Ramsey filed an appeal and was appointed 
counsel.  His counsel has now filed a motion to withdraw her representation pursuant to 
Local Appellate Rule (“L.A.R.”) 109.2(a).  Ramsey has not filed a pro se brief in 
response.  For the reasons that follow, we will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the 
proceedings below. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we only 
detail the facts necessary for this appeal.  While on release, Ramsey engaged in violent 
conduct towards his girlfriend, Kayla Firmin. Since the beginning of their relationship in 
2017, violent outbursts occurred frequently.  Ramsey choked Firmin on multiple 
occasions, often leaving her in an unconscious or nearly unconscious state.  This behavior 
peaked on the evening of July 26, 2018, when Ramsey grabbed Firmin, threw her up 
against a wall, and choked her until she nearly lost consciousness.  After Ramsey 
threatened further violence the following morning, Firmin hid in her car and contacted 
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the York Police Department, detailing the incident and the previous domestic abuse for 
the first time.  
Based on evidence at the house and Firmin’s statements, police issued an arrest 
warrant for Ramsey on July 30.  State authorities arrested Ramsey on August 12, and 
charged him with state crimes of strangulation and harassment.  On August 14, two days 
after the state charges were filed, U.S. Marshals arrested Ramsey for violation of the 
terms of his supervised release.  
At the revocation proceeding on August 16, 2018, the District Court heard 
testimony from Firmin, a York County police officer, and Ramsey’s probation officer 
supporting the Government’s charges.  The Court also heard testimony from Ramsey and 
his nephew challenging Firmin’s testimony.  Following this testimony, the Court found 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the strangulation charge against Ramsey, a 
Grade A violation of his release conditions.  The Court, after considering the factors 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sentenced him to 36 months of incarceration.  
After the revocation of his supervised release, Ramsey appealed.  His appointed 
counsel then filed a motion to withdraw her representation pursuant to L.A.R. 109.2(a), 
along with an Anders brief arguing that the appeal was frivolous.  See United States v. 
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967). The Government agrees that Ramsey’s appeal is frivolous.  Ramsey did not file a 
pro se brief in response to this motion. 
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II. 
 In appeals that involve an Anders brief, we apply plenary review to determine 
whether there are any nonfrivolous issues on appeal. Simon v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 
679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012), as amended (May 16, 2012).  
III. 
There are two considerations in our review: (1) whether counsel adequately 
fulfilled the requirements of L.A.R. 109.2(a), and (2) whether an independent review of 
the record reveals any nonfrivolous issues. Youla, 241 F.3d at 300 (citing United States v. 
Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000)). “If the panel agrees that the appeal is without 
merit, it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without appointing 
new counsel.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). 
A. 
The first prong of the Anders analysis is satisfied if counsel “has thoroughly 
examined the record in search of appealable issues” and “explain[ed] why the issues are 
frivolous.” Youla, 241 F.3d at 300 (citing Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780). Counsel for Ramsey 
adequately does so in this case, thoroughly examining the frivolity of an appeal based on 
(1) jurisdictional and due process issues, (2) factual determinations of the judge at the 
revocation proceeding, and (3) possible sentencing errors.  
i. 
Regarding due process concerns, counsel explains that Ramsey was given 
sufficient notice of the alleged violation, that the revocation hearing was held within a 
reasonable amount of time (15 days), and that Ramsey was represented by counsel and 
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given the opportunity to speak on his own behalf during the proceeding—all of which 
satisfy the necessary standards.  See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985); Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786–90 (1973).  The Anders brief is therefore adequate on this 
point. See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
ii. 
 To address an appeal of the District Court’s factual finding that Ramsey was guilty 
of a violation, his counsel relies on United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 
2004), which held that it is not necessary that the probationer be adjudged guilty of a 
crime to revoke probation, “but only that the court be reasonably satisfied that he has 
violated one of the conditions.” Id. at 566 (citing United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.3d 
311, 317 (3d Cir. 1976)).  The language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) requires that the 
defendant is found to have violated a condition of supervised release only by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  By ably applying these rules to the significant factual 
testimony provided by the Government in support of revoking Ramsey’s supervised 
release, the Anders brief adequately reasons why there are no nonfrivolous issues to 
appeal.  See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
iii. 
 Regarding Ramsey’s revocation sentence, his counsel points to United States v. 
Clark, 726 F.3d 496 (3d Cir. 2013), which held that a post-revocation sentence must 
involve “meaningful consideration” of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and those factors 
made relevant to post-revocation sentencing by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and (h).  Id. at 502.   
Ultimately, we affirm the sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
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have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.” Id. at 500 (quoting United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770 (3d. Cir. 
2010)).  As counsel for Ramsey ably highlights in her Anders brief, the District Court 
sufficiently used the § 3553(a) factors, especially by using the history and characteristics 
of Ramsey.  By noting this consideration, along with the District Court’s imposition of a 
sentence within the recommended guidelines range, the Anders brief is adequate on this 
point. See Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
B. 
Turning to the second prong of the Anders analysis, we undertake an independent 
review of the record for nonfrivolous issues.  Id. at 300; see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  
We are not required to conduct a complete scouring of the record when the Anders brief 
appears adequate; the appellate court is instead guided in reviewing the record by the 
brief itself.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 301 (citing United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 
(7th Cir. 1996)).  An independent review of the record is more difficult without a pro se 
brief from Ramsey.  In Youla, where the Court rejected the Anders brief filed by counsel, 
the defendant had filed a twenty-six page brief in response to the motion by his counsel. 
Youla, 241 F.3d at 301. 
 After review, we find no unaddressed nonfrivolous issues not raised by counsel in 
their Anders brief. 
IV. 
In sum, the record presents no nonfrivolous issue to appeal. We therefore grant 
counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
